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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of down-
link bandwidth allocation in a non-cooperative IEEE 802.16
OFDM/TDMA based wireless mesh network, and propose an auc-
tion based framework in which the gateway, equipped with the
precious high speed Internet connection, serves as the auctioneer
while the first-level mesh routers (MRs) (i.e., those with direct
wireless connections to the gateway) act as bidders competing
resources among each other. We then present two novel relay
auction (RA) approaches to allocate time-slots among MRs and
analyze the bidding strategy using the solution concept of Nash
equilibrium. Through simulations, we find that the proposed
RA algorithms can achieve competitive performance in terms
of resource allocation efficiency compared with Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) approaches, while having the capability to strike a
proper balance between efficiency and fairness by adjusting the
payment function. Specifically, with a smaller payment parameter
value, the RA algorithms can also achieve much better connection
blocking probability performance than VCG algorithms.
Index Terms—Wireless mesh networks, downlink bandwidth
allocation, auction algorithms, Nash equilibrium, Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves auction, service dependability.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a means to provide universal Internet access services at
affordable monetary and infrastructure costs in rural areas, the
research and deployment of IEEE 802.16-based WMNs have
gained enormous popularity recently [1], [11]. A typical WMN
consists of mesh routers (MRs) that not only provide wireless
access for mesh clients (MCs) but also form the backbone
of the network. To provide broadband out-bound access,
gateways are usually installed between the mesh backbone
and the Internet. Consequently, as shown in Fig. 1, to provide
broadband Internet services to a remote area, the MRs close
to the gateway can work as relay nodes transmitting traffic
between the Internet and the MRs far away from the gateway.
One of the key enabling features behind such a hierarchical
WMN is that a MR should not only serve the MCs in its
own local cell, but also relay traffic for outer level MRs.
Unfortunately, this kind of cooperation among MRs is not
always practical in reality, especially when these MRs are
owned by different profit-maximizing entities so that they
have to compete with each other for radio resource. In such
a non-cooperative environment, a MR will rationally exhibit
selfish behaviors driven by self-interests in that the MR may
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Fig. 1: Structure of a hierarchical wireless mesh network.
report a bogus channel information or valuation so as to
improve its own benefit [7], or refuse to relay other MRs’
traffic because relaying traffic will inevitably consume its own
resource and consequently degrade the performance of its local
cell. Though these non-cooperative behaviors could improve
the performance for the selfish MR itself, they may lead to
inefficient or unfair resource utilization for the whole system.
Several recent works [5], [12] have addressed the problem
of resource allocation in WMNs, but they are either based
on a cooperative situation or the assumption that the relay
node itself does not have local connections to serve, which are
different from our model where a relay MR should serve both
local and relay connections in a non-cooperative environment.
The resource allocation problem in a competitive envi-
ronment can be effectively addressed by means of auction
theory [9], which is widely known to be efficient in allocating
resources in a non-cooperative situation, and is the focus of
our study. Specifically, in this hierarchical mesh infrastructure,
we assume using an IEEE 802.16 WirelessMAN-OFDM air
interface, where the physical layer is based on orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM), and the media ac-
cess control (MAC) scheme is based on time-division multiple
access (TDMA). With OFDM/TDMA, all subchannels are
allocated to one connection at a time. Thus, in our model, the
auction goods are time-slots, the auctioneer is the gateway who
has radio resource, i.e., time-slots, to allocate, and the bidders
2are MRs who need to request time-slots from the gateway and
use them for local or relay traffic transmissions.
To implement an auction approach in WMNs, two challeng-
ing problems must be tackled. First, a succinct and expressive
bidding language is necessary. Here, we define a bidder’s
valuation function by quantifying its valuation on the allocated
resource under the current state, and then fully characterize it
simply by a single scalar parameter. Thus, each bidder can
submit the scalar as its bid, thereby leading to an efficient and
practical bidding process. Second, how should we define “pay-
ment”? In some auction-based algorithms [5], [14], payments
are expressed in terms of money or some kinds of virtual
parameters, and thus, suffer from a lack of practical meanings
and significance. Here we consider associating payment with
the time-slots used by an MR to relay other MR’s packets.
Specifically, to win time-slots allocated by the gateway, a
bidder must “pay” some wireless resources, i.e., time-slots,
and use them to forward an outer level MR’s traffic.
In our previous work [8], we have proposed two kinds of
auction methods based on the well known Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) model [9]. Unfortunately, there is one severe
drawback in VCG-based algorithms in that they do not con-
sider fairness performance [2]. This is clearly undesirable in a
wireless resource allocation environment where the gateway
should provide some level of QoS guarantees in terms of
fairness. To overcome the drawback of the VCG algorithms, in
this paper, we propose a novel relay auction (RA) framework
based on a concave utility function, where the bid submitted
by a MR is a scalar associated with its reported valuation,
while the payment is increasing with this bidding scalar value.
Specifically, depending on the type of payment function, i.e.,
linear or logarithmic payment function, we design two RA
algorithms, called RALiP and RALoP. We first prove the
existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium (NE) [13]. We
then compare the performance of these auction algorithms
through simulations, and find that the proposed RA algorithms
can achieve aggregate throughput performance comparable to
VCG approach, while they can adjust the resource ratio allo-
cated to different level of MRs, so as to strike a proper balance
between efficiency and fairness. From a service dependability
perspective, the performance of our RA algorithms is also
better than VCG in terms of connection blocking probability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the
system model and auction model in Section II. In Section III,
our novel relay auction approaches are proposed. Section IV
gives the simulation results. We conclude in Section V.
II. MODEL
A. System Model
In this paper, we consider an IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA-
based WMN with three hierarchical levels as shown in Fig. 1
and focus on downlink resource allocation. Such a hierarchical
network structure is highly practical and can be used to model
a WMN in a rural area, where at Level-0, there is a wireless
gateway that has direct connection to the Internet. There are
N Level-1 MRs, denoted by MRL1i , i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , N},
surrounding the gateway and providing wireless access for
their clients. Each MR and its corresponding clients form a
cell. Outside Level-1, to cover a wide geographical area (a
necessary condition in a rural area), there are N other MRs,
denoted by MRL2i , which are located far from the central
gateway. As a result, each MRL2i does not have direct wireless
connections with the gateway, and it can only get broadband
Internet services through the relaying services provided by
MRL1i . We also assume that MR
L1
i in Level-1 just relays
traffics to MRL2i in Level-2. Every Level-1 MR
L1
i competes
with each other for the bandwidth resource provided by the
gateway.
We assume all cells operate under IEEE 802.16
OFDM/TDMA-TDD mode, and each adjacent cell uses a
different frequency band. The MAC frame is composed of
downlink and uplink subframes. Each downlink subframe
is composed of Td time-slots, each of which is used for
transmission of packets corresponding to one connection. For
uplink and downlink transmission using OFDM, each MR uses
M subchannels with total bandwidth of B MHz. There are
RGL1i packets per time-slot transmitted from the gateway to
MRL1i . We use PER
L1
i and PER
L2
i to denote the average
packet error rates in the downlink of MRL1i ’s and MR
L2
i ’s
local cell, respectively. These PERs depend on the PHY layer
packet transmission error rate and MAC layer packet dropping
rate. Then we can get the average number of packets that
can be transmitted successfully per time-slot from MRL1i and
MRL2i as a
L1
i and a
L2
i , respectively, i.e.,
aL1i = R
GL1
i · (1− PERL1i ) (1)
aL2i = a
L1
i · (1− PERL2i ) (2)
We also assume that there are NL1i MCs served by MR
L1
i ,
and NL2i MCs served by MR
L2
i . Thus, when T
L1
i time-slots
are allocated to MRL1i for its local usage and T
L2
i time-slots
are used to relay Level-2 MR’s traffic, the average received
packets per frame by a Level-1 MC and a Level-2 MC are
then given by:
Q
L1
i (T
L1
i ) =
aL1i
NL1i
· TL1i (3)
Q
L2
i (T
L2
i ) =
aL2i
NL2i
· TL2i (4)
B. Auction Framework
In our proposed auction framework, each MRL1i needs
to compete for time-slots through auction, and the valuation
function can be fully characterized by a scalar valuation
parameter. Specifically, every MRL1i calculates the valuation
parameter aL1i and then submits a bid bi = μi(a
L1
i ) to
the gateway according to a rationally selfish strategy. For
MRL2i , because a
L2
i depends on PER
L2
i and MR
L1
i ’s re-
ported valuation parameter, we assume that every MRL2i
can send PERL2i to the gateway via a secure out-of-band
control channel through MRL1i . After receiving the announced
bidding profile B = {b1, b2, . . . , bN} from every MRL1i ,
and all level-2 PERL2i , the gateway will know each MR’s
reported valuation, and then calculate the allocation T =
3T (B) = {T1, T2, . . . , Ti, . . . , TN}, which represents the num-
ber of time-slots allocated to each MRL1i , as well as the
payment P = P (B) = {TL21 , TL22 , . . . , TL2i , . . . , TL2N }, which
represents the number of time-slots that should be used by
MRL1i to relay MR
L2
i ’s traffic. Subsequently, the allocation
and payment results are transmitted to each MRL1i . Upon
receiving them, each MRL1i gets to know T
L1
i = Ti − TL2i
and payment TL2i .
In a typical auction, the utility of a bidder is the value
received by this bidder minus the payment assigned by the
auctioneer. However, in our model, to provide practical mean-
ings for payment, we associate the payment with the practical
radio resource, i.e., time-slots. Thus, when MRL1i receives Ti
time-slots and accept TL2i time-slots as payment, its ultimate
utility is its true valuation when getting TL1i = Ti−TL2i , i.e.,
UL1i (Ti, T
L2
i ) = V
L1
i (Ti − TL2i ) = V L1i (TL1i ) (5)
For Level-2 MRL2i , its utility is just its valuation with T
L2
i
time-slots, i.e.,
UL2i (T
L2
i ) = V
L2
i (T
L2
i ) (6)
Specifically, we consider the following logarithmic function
to express a level-1 MC’s valuation on its average received
packets per frame, i.e.,
vL1i (a
L1
i , T
L1
i ) = log(Q
L1
i (T
L1
i ) + 1) = log(
aL1i
Ni
· TL1i + 1)
(7)
Thus, when there are NL1i MCs served by MR
L1
i , its
valuation on TL1i time-slots can be defined as:
V L1i (a
L1
i , T
L1
i ) = N
L1
i ·vL1i (a1i , TL1i ) = NL1i ·log(
aL1i
NL1i
·TL1i +1)
(8)
Similarly, MRL2i ’s valuation on T
L2
i time-slots is:
V L2i (a
L2
i , T
L2
i ) = N
L2
i · log(
aL2i
NL2i
· TL2i + 1) (9)
Thus, according to (5) and (6), their utilities are:
UL1i (Ti, T
L2
i ) = V
L1
i (a
L1
i , Ti − TL2i ) (10)
UL2i (T
L2
i ) = V
L2
i (a
L2
i , T
L2
i ) (11)
Obviously, UL1i is concave on both valuation parameter a
L1
i
and allocated resource TL1i , while U
L2
i is also concave on both
aL2i and T
L2
i .
III. RELAY AUCTION
Generally, the more resource a bidder requests, the higher
payment it should pay to the auctioneer. Thus, we define
the payment as a function increasing with the bidding scalar
bi, and propose a relay auction (RA) algorithm, which is
formalized as follows.
A. Auctioning Mechanism
1) Bidding rule: MRL1i submits a scalar value bi to the
gateway, and let b = {bi : bmin ≤ bi ≤ bmax}. We also
let MRL2i send its average packet error rate PER
L2
i
to the gateway via a secure out-of-band control channel
through MRL1i . Then, the gateway can know MR
L2
i ’s
valuation as aL2i = bi · (1− PERL2i ).
2) Payment rule: If MRL1i gets Ti time-slots, it must use
TL2i = f(bi) ·Ti time-slots for relaying MRL2i ’s traffic,
where f(bi) is increasing with bi, and 0 ≤ f(bi) ≤ 1.
Here, we consider two different payment functions:
f1(bi) = biA , and f2(bi) =
log(bi+1)
A , where A is a
payment parameter.
3) Allocation rule:
T∗ = {T ∗1 , T ∗2 , · · · , T ∗N} = argmax{Ti}
∑
i
UL1i (Ti)
= argmax
{Ti}
∑
i
(NL1i · log(
bi
NL1i
· (Ti − TL2i ) + 1)
+ NL2i · log(
bi · (1− PERL2i )
NL2i
· TL2i + 1))
(12)
subject to:
(I)
∑
i
(TL1i + T
L2
i ) = Td (II) T
L2
i = f(bi) · Ti
B. Nash Equilibrium
Our proposed relay auction can be formulated as a strategic
non-cooperative game, i.e., Γ  [N, {bi}i∈N, {UL1i (B)}i∈N],
with N players, where N  {1, · · · , N} is the player set,
{b1, · · · , bN} is the action profile, and UL1i is the utility
function of player i.
A useful solution concept of such a game is called a Nash
equilibrium (NE) [13], which is a bidding profile B∗ where
no MR wants to deviate unilaterally, i.e.,
UL1i (b
∗
i ; b
∗
−i) ≥ UL1i (bi;b∗−i), ∀i ∈ N, ∀bi ≥ 0 (13)
We first establish the existence of the NE in our proposed
relay auction.
Theorem 1. There exists a bidding profile B∗ = {b∗i , · · · , b∗N}
to achieve Nash equilibrium in the relay auction.
Proof: According to [3] and [4], a Nash equilibrium B∗
exists in the game if the following two conditions are satisfied
for all i = 1, · · · , N :
1) the bidding strategy bi is a nonempty, convex and
compact subset of some Euclidean space N ; and
2) UL1i (B) is continuous in B and quasi-concave in bi
The first condition is easily satisfied because we have bi ∈
[bmin, bmax]. For utility function UL1i , because
∂2U
L1
i
b2i
< 0,
it is strictly concave on bi. As a concave function is also
quasi-concave, the second condition is then satisfied. Thus,
the existence of NE is proven.
Having established the existence of NE, we further investi-
gate the uniqueness of this NE bidding profile in relay auction.
4To this end, we first construct MRL1i ’s best response function
(for fixed b−i) as:
βi(b−i) = {bi | bi = argmax
˜bi≥0
UL1i (b˜i;b−i)} (14)
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique NE B∗ = {b∗i , · · · , b∗N} in
the relay auction.
Proof: We assume that NE is not unique, and there
exists at least another one B˜ = {b˜1, · · · , b˜N}, and B∗ = B˜.
According to the definitions of NE and the best response
function, p∗i and p˜i must satisfy:
b∗i = maxb∗i U
L1
i (b
∗
i , b
∗
−i) (15)
b˜i = maxb˜iU
L1
i (b˜i, b˜−i) (16)
However, because UL1i is concave and differentiable, for a
fixed b−i, there is a unique best strategy bi that satisfies
bi = maxbiU
L1
i (bi, b−i). These contradict the assumption that
B∗ = B˜. Thus, B∗ = B˜, and there is a unique NE in this
auction.
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Fig. 2: Best response functions: (a) payment function is
f1(bi) = biA ; and (2) payment function is f2(bi) =
log(bi+1)
A .
Fig. 2 graphically depicts the existence and uniqueness of
NE in case of N = 2, where aL21 = a
L2
2 = 10, and A = 20.
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulations results to evaluate
the performance of the auction algorithms.
A. Simulation Configuration
The simulation topology is shown in Fig. 1. Specifically,
we assume each MR has 64 subcarriers with a total frequency
band of 10 MHz. The frequency bands for adjacent MRs
are non-coverlapping and frequency reuse is utilized. Conse-
quently, the OFDM symbol time is 8μs, in which 1.6μs is
the guard interval. We further group 25 OFDM symbols into
a slot, and let one DL-subframe have 10 time-slots. Thus, the
DL-subframe length is 2ms. The wireless channel is modeled
as six-path frequency-selective Rayleigh slow fading channel;
each path is simulated by Clark’s fading model and suffers
from different Rayleigh fading with the maximum Doppler
frequency of 30 Hz. Because the coherence time 33.3ms
is much larger than the DL-subframe length, the channel
condition can be regarded as static during the iterative bidding
period to achieve NE. This is a realistic assumption in a
WMN because the MRs are immobile. We also assume that
the power delay profile is exponentially decaying with e−2l,
where l is the multipath index. The AWGN power density
is −80dBW/Hz. Furthermore, the channel corresponding to
different users has the same but independent statistics. We
assume the average SNR is identical for all subcarriers to a
particular connection, but the transmission rate in different
subcarrier is different when adaptive modulation is performed
independently in each subcarrier.
We simulate CVCG (a classical VCG-based auction algo-
rithm based on a linear utility function as proposed in [8]
), QVCG (an auction approach applying the VCG allocation
and payment policies to a non-linear environment as pro-
posed in [8]), RALiP (our RA algorithm with linear payment
function f1(bi) = biA ), and RALoP (our RA algorithm with
logarithmic payment function f1(bi) =
log(bi+1)
A ). We further
assume with proper scheduling and queuing policies as well
as adaptive modulation used in the MR, the packet error rate
in MRL1i and MR
L2
i are all maintained at a constant value,
and PERL1i = 1% and PER
L2
i = 1%. In this setting, N = 2
and there are 10 MCs in each cell.
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Fig. 3: System average throughput vs. payment parameter.
Fig. 3 illustrates the system average throughput performance
of the different four auction algorithms considered in our
study. We can see that although VCG-based approaches gen-
erate higher throughput than those of the RA algorithms, the
throughput of RALiP and RALoP achieve almost 95% of that
for CVCG with the increase of payment parameter. This can
be explained by the fact that the time-slots used by Level-1
MR to relay Level-2 MR’s packets decrease if the payment
parameter becomes higher. Because Level-1 MRs are close to
the gateway and generally have better transmission conditions
than those of Level-2 MRs, the overall system throughput
increases when more resources are used for Level-1 MRs’s
traffic. On the other hand, RALoP is superior to RALiP. This
is because the logarithmic payment function used by RALoP
makes Level-1 MR pay less given the same bids, and thus, a
larger portion of resource is allocated to MRL1i .
Now let us consider the fairness performance in terms of
Jain fairness index [6] in Fig. 4. We can see that the Jain
5fairness indices for RALiP and RALoP are highly dependent
on the payment parameter A. RALiP achieves its highest index
value when A = 32, while RALoP’s fairness achieves its
peak when A = 8, and both are larger than that of CVCG
and QVCG. Thus, the proposed RA algorithms can be used
to strike a proper balance between efficiency and fairness,
and achieve better fairness performance than VCG, while
maintaining good efficiency performance.
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Fig. 4: Jain fairness index vs. payment parameter.
To quantify the service dependability for Level-2 MRs in the
system, we assume that each local connection generates 2500
packets per second in the downlink, and calculate the Level-
2 MR’s connection blocking probability (CBP) according
to Engset formula [10]. The Level-2 MRs’ average CBP
performance is shown in Fig. 5. As discussed earlier, a higher
payment parameter means that fewer time-slots can be used
to relay Level-2 MRs’traffic. Thus, CBP values of RALiP and
RALoP increase with A. When A is relatively larger, such
as A > 110, the CBP values of RALiP and RALoP are
higher than those of CVCG and QVCG. On the other hand,
when A < 62 for RALiP and A < 15 for RALoP, the RA
algorithms have better CBP performance than VCG methods,
demonstrating that they have a higher service dependability.
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Fig. 5: Level-2 CBP vs. payment parameter.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the downlink bandwidth allocation
problem in a non-cooperative IEEE 802.16 OFDM/TDMA-
based hierarchical wireless mesh network. We design an
auction framework to let rationally selfish mesh routers request
time-slots actively and motivate them to forward an outer
level MR’s traffic. Based on this framework, we propose novel
relay auction algorithms and analyze the bidding strategy using
the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. After proving the
existence and uniqueness of NE, we study the performance
of the RA auction algorithms with our previously proposed
VCG algorithms through simulations, which indicate that the
proposed relay auction algorithms can achieve competitive
performance in terms of resource allocation efficiency as the
VCG approaches, while being able to adjust the resource
ratio allocated to different levels of mesh routers, so as to
strike a proper balance between efficiency and fairness. With
a smaller payment parameter, the relay auction algorithms can
also achieve a higher service dependability compared with the
VCG algorithms.
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